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Introduction
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant rejects the traditional metaphysical – i.e., the ontological, 
cosmological  and  physico-theological  (or  teleological)  –  proofs  for  God’s  existence.2 In  the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that our duties are not grounded in the 
divine  will,  but  solely in  the  moral  law (G 4:431).3 Otherwise,  morality  would  be based on 
religion, which would amount to theological morality and heteronomy. Hence, faith in God seems 
to be no requisite for a virtuous life and atheism seems to be compatible with morality within 
Kant’s philosophy. Yet, in many of his other works, including the Critique of Practical Reason, 
Critique of Judgment, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and his different Lectures  
on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, Kant argues that ‘morality leads inevitably to religion’ 
(CPrR 5:125;  Rel  6:6)  and insists  that  faith  in  God is  necessary for the intelligibility  of the 
possibility  of  the  highest  good,  i.e.  the  harmonious  and  proportionate  union  of  virtue  and 
happiness, as the final end of the moral law. Hence, Kant defends moral theism understood as 
faith in God based on morality, viz. ‘a conviction of the existence of God on practical grounds’ 
(LPR/Volckmann 28:1151).4 Furthermore,  Kant condemns atheism on  moral grounds arguing 
that  –  by rejecting  the  idea  of  God as  a  sufficient  cause  of  the  highest  good –  it  rules  out 
additional religious incentives to morality (CPR A 812, B 841),5 leads to moral despair, weakens 
respect for the moral law, damages the moral disposition (CJ 5:540), causes social disorder (O 
8:146) and robs fellow citizens of incentives to morality viewed as commanded and enforced by 
God (LE/Vigilantius 27:531). This paper explores (1) Kant’s moral criticism that atheism leads to 
moral despair by lacking the cognitively determinate and psychological reassuring view offered 
by rational faith for rendering the possibility of the highest good intelligible, and (2) five rational, 
non-theistic strategies that atheists  could embrace for upholding the possibility  of the highest 
good and resisting moral despair.
Kant’s moral despair argument against atheism
Kant’s practical arguments for rational faith in God (CPrR 5:110–14, 124–46)6 are directed to the 
possibility of the highest good. Kant’s argument starts from the unquestionable validity of the 
moral law as a fact of reason. This law commands categorically through reason. If the moral law 
commands us to pursue the highest good as the final end, we have to do so and the highest good 
has to be possible (CPrR 5:57). If this were not the case, we would not act rationally – for rational 
agency entails that if we intend an end by our agency, it should be possible to realize this end –  
and the moral law that commands us to seek this end would be invalid. However, given our finite 
(physical) capacities and the amoral nature of the world, which does not systematically connect 
virtue with proportionate happiness, it remains unclear how we are to establish the highest good. 
Yet, if there were an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent author of the world who is at the same 
time a holy, beneficent and just world ruler, i.e., God according to moral theism, such a being 
could supplement our limited endeavours and complete the realization of the highest good. Since 
theoretical reason cannot demonstrate the impossibility of God’s existence and rational faith in 
God does not conflict with theoretical reason, we are justified in assuming the existence of God 
(CPrR 5:135–43). Moreover, Kant argues that rational faith in God is the only cognitive pathway 
for understanding how the highest good is to be brought about. Hence, he concludes that we have 
to believe in God (CPrR 5:125–6, 142–6). Faith in God is thus grounded in the necessity of being 
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able to think the possibility of the highest good so that we can rationally execute the commands 
of the moral law.7 Precisely for this reason, Kant argues that faith in God is morally necessary 
and that morality inevitably leads to religion (CPrR 5:125, Rel 6:6) in this sense that religion,  
while not being necessary for grounding the principles of morality, is necessary for rendering the 
completion of the final  object of morality intelligible. Consequently, Kant contends that if one 
doubts the possibility of God’s existence, one has to give up the highest good, fall into despair 
and hold all moral laws for empty imagination. 
Kant’s criticism that atheism leads to moral despair is most fiercely expressed in the Critique of  
Judgment, where Kant conceives of a righteous man who is convinced that there is no God and 
who ‘would merely unselfish establish the good’ (CJ 5:450). Yet, so Kant argues,
his effort is limited; and from nature he can, to be sure, expect some contingent assistance here and there, but 
never a lawlike agreement in accordance with constant rules […] with the ends to act in behalf of which he 
feels himself bound and impelled. Deceit, violence, and envy will always surround him, even though he is 
himself honest, peaceable, and benevolent; and the righteous ones besides himself that he will still encounter  
will, in spite of all their worthiness to be happy, nevertheless be subject by nature, which pays no attention to 
that, to all the evils of poverty, illnesses, and untimely death, […] and will always remain thus until one wide  
grave engulfs them all together (whether honest or dishonest, it makes no difference here) and flings them 
[…] back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were drawn. – The end, therefore, 
which this well-intentioned person had and should have had before his eyes in his conformity to the moral  
law, he would certainly have to give up as impossible; or, if he would remain attached to the appeal of his 
inner moral vocation and not weaken the respect,  by which the moral law immediately influences him to 
obedience, by the nullity of the only idealistic final end that is adequate to its high demand […], then he must 
assume the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e., of God, from a practical point of view, i.e., in order 
to form a concept of at least the possibility of the final end that is prescribed to him by morality. (CJ 5:452-3)8
Kant’s  moral  despair  argument  against  atheism  argument  can  thus  be  summarized  and 
reconstructed as follows. Its premises are: (P1) the amoral nature of the world, the failings and 
sufferings of the righteous and the futility of their moral endeavours offer no perspectives for 
establishing the highest good; (P2) moral theism offers the only concept, i.e., the existence of an 
omnipotent,  intelligent and just moral world ruler, for rendering the possibility of the highest 
good  intelligible;  (P3)  (dogmatic)  atheism  rejects  the  concept  described  in  (P2).  Its  main 
conclusions are: (C1) an atheist has to abandon the highest good; and (C2) (dogmatic) atheism 
leads to moral despair. It is this argument that I challenge by proposing the following five replies.
First reply: the appeal to a non-theistic, moral teleology 
Is Kant right in arguing that moral faith in (the idea of) God as a just world ruler provides the 
only concept for embracing the possibility of the highest good? If we could conceive non-theistic, 
moral-teleological accounts that render the highest good intelligible, the atheist would not have to 
abandon the possibility of the highest good. While denying the existence of God, an atheist can 
still commit himself – because of the authority of the moral law directing an agent to pursue the 
highest good – to embrace some non-theistic, moral-teleological schema that suffices to be able to 
think the possibility of the highest good. An atheist  can assume an intelligent,  rational world 
order  through  which  a  moral  teleology  necessary  for  establishing  the  highest  good  can  be 
presupposed. For example, Fichte holds that the morally well-disposed subject believes that the 
world in which he acts is in conformity with his moral actions without believing in (the idea of) a  
personal and transcendent God over and above this impersonal, rational and teleological world 
order. Theravada Buddhism embraces the concept of karma as a moral-teleological mechanism 
that is operative in nature and that lets us think a harmony of virtue and happiness but that does  
not  appeal  to  a  God.  By analogy,  an  atheist  may  dismiss  moral  theism and yet  ground the 
possibility  of  the  highest  good  in  some (unknown)  moral-teleological  mechanism  in  nature 
through which the natural and the moral world are brought into harmony and through which the 
highest good will be attained by virtue of moral agency. A drawback to such an account seems to  
be that it  is  less cognitively  determinate and  specific than Kant’s moral theism regarding the 
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precise mechanism of  how the highest good is to be brought about. Yet, as Byrne (2007:93) 
notices,  avoiding  commitment  to  ‘metaphysical  assumptions  containing  rich  pictures  of  the 
possible  mechanism behind moral  teleology is  more “Critical”  than Kant’s own apparatus of 
postulates.’  Hence,  an  atheist  embracing  the  possibility  of  a  non-theistic  conception  of  the 
realization of the highest good need not necessarily succumb into moral despair.
Second reply: the appeal to a non-theistic, natural teleology
In the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Kant  himself  considers  the possibility  of a non-theistic, 
natural-teleological conception of the realization of the highest good:
I said above that in accordance with a mere course of nature in the world happiness in exact conformity with  
moral worth is not to be expected and is to be held impossible, and that therefore the possibility of the highest 
good  […]  can  be  granted  only  on  the  presupposition  of  a  moral  author  in  the  world.  […]  In  fact,  the 
impossibility referred to is merely subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to conceive, in the 
mere  course  of  nature,  a  connection  so  exactly  proportioned  and  thoroughly  purposive  between  events 
occurring in the world in accordance with such different laws, although, as with everything else in nature that 
is  purposive,  it  nevertheless  cannot  prove  –  that  is,  set  forth  sufficiently  on  objective  grounds  –  the  
impossibility of it in accordance with universal laws of nature. (CPrR 5:145) 
Kant thus argues that – objectively speaking – there are two equal possibilities for conceiving the 
highest good: moral theism and natural teleology. He concedes that  objective grounds for the 
possibility that nature itself provides the unification of virtue and happiness in accordance with its 
own natural  laws cannot  be  ruled out.  However,  so Kant  argues,  since  human reason is  not 
capable of fathoming in detail  how the latter possibility has to be conceived, he concludes that 
there are compelling subjective grounds for human reason to dispense with this possibility and to 
prefer the theistic conception of how the highest good is to be brought about: 
But as for the way we are to represent this possibility [of the highest good], whether in accordance with 
universal laws of nature without a wise author presiding over nature or only on the supposition of such an  
author, reason cannot decide this objectively. Now a subjective condition of reason enters into this, the only 
way in which it is theoretically possible for it to think the exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm 
of morals as the condition of the possibility of the highest good, and at the same time the only way that is  
conducive to morality. (CPrR 5:145)
Both moral theism and natural teleology are thus two  objectively equal ways to represent the 
possibility  of the highest good. The difference between these two options is that the latter  is 
cognitively less determinate and specific: it falls beyond the scope of our reason to conceive how 
natural teleological laws may establish an exact proportion of happiness and virtue, whereas faith 
in God as moral world ruler does seem to provide us with a more vivid and concrete account of  
the possibility  of  such a  harmony.  Kant  thus  concludes  that  human beings will  prefer  moral 
theism  for  conceiving  the  possibility  of  the  highest  good  because  the  postulate  of  God  is 
subjectively more comprehensible  to our human cognitive  faculties  than a  view according to 
which the highest good would be in conformity with mere laws of nature.9 Yet, it is important to 
keep in mind that Kant himself concedes the validity of appealing to a natural teleological world 
order  as  an  objective  alternative  for  considering  the  possibility  of  the  highest  good without 
appealing to a supersensible entity.  As such, Kant implicitly  provides the atheist  with a non-
theistic account for affirming the possibility of the highest good. And although Kant thinks that 
moral theism is  subjectively more attractive or persuasive for human reason by offering a more 
specific  and determinate  account  of  how the highest  good may be brought  about,  he has  no 
conclusive objective arguments for tipping the balance in favour of moral theism.
Third reply: the appeal to an alternative, ‘negative’ rationality claim 
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However,  appealing to some non-theistic,  metaphysical  schemes such as a  teleological  world 
order for guaranteeing the possibility of the highest good may be a leap to far for some radical 
atheists  as  it  still  relies  on  some kind  of  metaphysical  faith.  Moreover,  an  atheist  may  also 
advocate a Darwinian view on nature and reject the existence of a teleological world order. Yet, 
even such atheists could still uphold the possibility of the highest good by adopting the moderate 
epistemic stance that – in spite of what Kant thinks – the impossibility of the highest good is not 
sufficiently or objectively proven and hence recognize – because of their commitment to the moral 
law – that the highest good is something valuable to be pursued. As long as there is no sufficient, 
objective proof for the impossibility of the highest good, there is no reason to regard our moral 
efforts for realising it as irrational, especially if it is our well-considered free and rational choice 
to put great  value on this  moral  ideal.  This negative  rationality  claim yields  a stance that  is 
genuinely ‘critical’ and that is more consistent with present-day scientific insights and growing 
secular pluralism in ethics. 
The idea that it  is not irrational to pursue the highest good as long as its impossibility is not 
proven does not contradict  Kant’s philosophy itself.  Both in  On the Common Saying and the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant contends that in the case of an end set as a duty it suffices that its  
possibility  is  not  demonstrably  impossible in  order  to  render  its  pursuit  rational.  In  On the 
Common Saying, he argues that the thought that a moral end has not yet been realized and for this 
reason will probably be never realized does not in itself justify to abandon this end ‘as long as its 
achievement is not demonstrably impossible’ (TP 8:309–10). Kant thus argues that if an end is 
morally valuable, the absence of proof of the impossibility of it suffices to render our efforts in its 
behalf rational.  In the  Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that our duty consists in acting in 
accordance with the idea of a moral end ‘even if there is not the least theoretical probability that it 
can be achieved, as long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated either’ (MM 6:354). Once 
more, Kant contends that if it is a duty to achieve an end, all that is needed to make the pursuit of 
that  end  rational  is  not  a  guarantee  that  it  can  be  achieved,  but  rather  the  absence  of  a  
demonstration that it cannot be achieved. The idea that rational agency directed to pursuing an 
end set as a duty only requires that the impossibility of the end is not proven – rather than that its 
possibility  has to be proven by postulating  God, provides  the atheist  with a rationally  stable 
alternative to moral theism in order not the abandon the highest good.
This approach also resists Hare’s claim that the atheist has only three options: (1) abandoning his 
pursuit of the highest good, (2) abandoning his atheism, and (3) staying caught in the dilemma 
between (1) and (2) (Hare 2006:64). Consequently, Hare argues that if the atheist replies to the 
dilemma by refusing to abandon his pursuit of the highest good, he has to assume the existence of 
God: ‘It is not that a person will do this, but that he must. He must, that is to say, if he is to be 
rational. This is what I mean by saying atheism is, for Kant, rationally unstable’ (Ibid.). Yet, by 
showing  that  the  atheist  need  not  abandon  the  pursuit  of  the  highest  good  by  adopting  the 
epistemological stance that this pursuit is not irrational as long as the impossibility of the highest 
good is  not sufficiently proven, not even in the case of a lack of faith in God, which will be 
argued in the following reply, it can be concluded that Hare’s dilemma fails and that the atheist 
must not assume God’s existence in order to be able to act rationally.
However, in defence of Kant, it might be argued that the atheist’s approach leaves it unclear how 
the systematicity and proportionality of virtue and happiness as core feature of the highest good 
can be guaranteed. Although it suffices to be convinced that the attainment of the highest good is 
not per se impossible in order to be able to rationally pursue it, one might question whether such 
an approach suffices for conceiving a  systematic and  necessary harmony – instead of a merely 
contingent aggregate – of virtue and happiness in the highest good. It is precisely this feature of 
systematicity that  Kant  thinks  a  righteous  atheist  like  Spinoza  lacks  in  conceptualising  the 
possibility of the highest good. Yet, as we shall see, there are also strands in Kant’s philosophy 
that do not primarily emphasise this systematic and proportionate union of virtue and happiness, 
but rather advocate an account of the highest good as a moral world of virtue and happiness 
conditioned by morality. Furthermore, we can stick to the argument that as long as there is no 
sufficient proof for the impossibility per se of some harmonious system of virtue and happiness, 
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there is no reason to conclude that we act irrationally in striving for such a system. With respect  
to the question of how such a system might be conceived and thought, it seems that Kant’s ethico-
theology provides us with a cognitively determinate and – perhaps above all – a psychologically  
reassuring, hence  subjectively more attractive view on the realisability of the highest good: ‘in 
order to provide my heart with conviction, weight and emphasis, I have need of a God who will  
make me participate in happiness in accordance with these eternal and unchangeable laws, if I am 
worthy of it’ (LPR/Pölitz 28:1116–7).10
Fourth reply: no sufficient proof for the impossibility of and hope for the highest good in 
case of a lack of faith 
 
If  Kant  were  really  to  succeed  in  arguing  that  moral  theism  offers  the  only pathway  for 
guaranteeing the possibility of the highest good, he would also have to prove its impossibility in 
case of a lack of faith. But Kant has no real sufficient, objective arguments for this. This is where 
Kant’s first premise comes in. In fact, Kant relies mainly on empirical and subjective evidence 
according to which the world’s amoral nature and the failures and sufferings of the righteous rule 
out  the  success  of  man’s  moral  actions,  display  their  futility  and  prove  the  (empirical) 
impossibility  of  the  highest  good.  Yet  Kant’s  evidence  here  is  rooted  in  a  pessimistic 
anthropological worldview, which is at odds with his optimistic beliefs about the final destiny of 
mankind in his Lectures on Ethics and On the Common Saying, where he argues that many proofs 
show that in the course of history the human race has made a substantial progress toward self-
perfection  (LE/Collins 27:470–1;  TP 8:310).  Surely,  the world taken as a realm of nature is 
completely amoral and we cannot deny that we are faced with sufferings and failures even of the 
most virtuous and righteous people. But, contra Kant, I contend that there are enough reasons to 
be more optimistic in this regard. Despite all its cruelties, mankind’s history has also abundantly 
shown its moral successes, such as the abolition of slavery, the spreading of democratic regimes, 
the promotion of equality between men and women, the institution of international human rights 
organizations, the right to free public opinion and speech, and so on. As Denis (2003:212) rightly 
notes: ‘despite Kant’s observations about the amoral nature of the world […], our day to day lives 
give us ample reason to see the world as amenable to our efforts’. 
Viewed as such, Kant’s first premise seems to be first and foremost rooted in a  particular and 
pessimistic anthropological stance and hence can neither appeal to universality, nor to objectivity. 
Moreover, in On the Common Saying, Kant himself recognizes that ‘empirical evidence against 
the success of […] resolves undertaken on hope does not count for anything’ (TP 8:309). Hence, 
an atheist who recognizes that the impossibility of the highest good is not objectively proven and 
who is confident in the future does not have to abandon the highest good and needs not succumb 
into moral despair. Furthermore, as Wood (1970:160) points out, Kant’s view that amorality of 
the world and the suffering of the righteous yield moral despair is only  provisional and hence 
limited: 
Such a despair must always be premature, in the sense that it is always beyond the power of a finite being to 
know absolutely that the world is destitute of moral goodness, that it provides no ground for the realization of 
his final end. His despair is always therefore a presumptuous judgment about the world. […] The uncertainty  
of the world and the finitude of his knowledge rather leave man suspended between hope and despair. 
Although man’s natural condition seems to  exhaust hope, as Kant holds, it  does not  refute it 
altogether and there are ample counterexamples furnishing evidence that confidence in a morally 
better future is not unwarranted.
Fifth reply: appeal to Kant’s alternative, ‘secular’ and ‘historical-immanent’ highest good
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Finally, dogmatic atheists may also bypass Kant’s conception of the highest good as happiness 
proportionate to virtue and restrict themselves to Kant’s conception of the highest good as the 
creation of a moral  world of virtue and happiness  conditioned by  morality,  the possibility  of 
which depends on human – but not divine – agency. The former account is ‘ideal-transcendent’ 
because it  refers to the unconditioned final  end of pure practical  reason as a mere object  of 
thought, and because the intelligibility of its realization depends on assuming the existence of a 
moral world ruler and the immortality of the soul. Hence, it is also a ‘theistic’ account of the 
highest good. The latter  account is ‘historical-immanent’ because it refers to social end to be 
pursued collectively by the human race in this world over the course of history. Hence, it is also a 
‘non-theistic’  account  of  the  highest  good.  While  Kant’s  ‘ideal-transcendent’  account  as 
happiness  in  perfect  proportion  to  virtue  is  predominant  in  his  philosophy,11 some  passages 
suggest  the  alternative  ‘secular’,  ‘historical-immanent’  account  of  the  highest  good.  In  this 
context, Kant approaches the highest good as ‘a system of well-disposed human beings’ (Rel 
6:97–98), ‘the existence of rational beings subject to moral laws’ (CJ 5:444, 450), ‘a final end’ 
determined by the moral law, viz. ‘the highest good in the world possible through freedom’ (CJ 
5:450), ‘the highest physical good that is possible in the world and which can be promoted, as far 
as it is up to us, as a final end, [i.e.] happiness – under the objective condition of the concordance 
of  humans  with  the  law of  morality’  (CJ  5:450),  ‘a  final  end  assigned  by  pure  reason and 
comprehending  the  whole  of  all  ends  under  one  principle  (a  world  as  the  highest  good and 
possible through our cooperation)’ (TP 8:280, fn),  and ‘the inner worth of the world’, namely 
‘freedom according to a power of choice that is not necessitated to act’ (LE/Collins 27:344).12 
This account of the highest good does not so much stress the systematic proportionality between 
happiness and virtue, but rather happiness in conformity to or conditioned by moral agency and 
virtue: it acknowledges the importance and necessity of happiness but makes its value dependent 
upon the morality of the maxims on which it is pursued.13 Hence, the realization of the ‘historical-
immanent’ highest good does not depend on the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, 
and offers a more fruitful account that is suitable to serve as the end of  our autonomous moral 
conduct and that lies entirely within the scope of our human agency. Adopting this ‘historical-
immanent’ account of the highest good provides even the most rabid atheist with a legitimate 
alternative  to  moral  theism  for  affirming  the  possibility  of  the  highest  good  and  hence  for 
resisting moral despair.
Conclusions
In spite of his rejection of the traditional metaphysical proofs of God’s existence, Kant defends 
moral theism, i.e. a subjective, rational conviction in the existence of God as a moral world ruler 
on behalf of the intelligibility of the highest good as the final end of the moral law. In the third 
Critique, Kant argues that atheism leads to moral despair by rejecting moral theism as the sole 
cognitively  determinate  and  psychologically  reassuring  view  for  rendering  the  highest  good 
intelligible.  Yet an atheist  could invoke different  strategies  for refuting Kant’s argument:  (1) 
adopting some non-theistic, moral-teleological world conception through which the highest good 
can be conceived, (2) adopting a natural teleology through which nature itself is conceived as the 
ground for the highest good, (3) adopting the epistemological stance that striving for the highest  
good is not irrational as long as its impossibility is not sufficiently demonstrated, (4) showing that 
Kant has not sufficiently proven the impossibility of the highest good in case of a lack of faith in 
God, and (5) appealing to an alternative, secular and historical-immanent account of the highest 
good as the creation of a moral world of virtue and happiness conditioned by morality.
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